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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to definitions of ethics, and business ethics in 
particular, we have relied in this paper on a quick survey of the 
literature.  We also referred to other writings to explain how 
interest-based lending escaped religions morality in the west.  After 
providing an Islamic perspective of ethics and business ethics, the 
article directs itself to the moral responsibilities of system 
participants.  Naturally there is a great deal of soul searching to do 
and there are tough questions that must be answered by everyone.  
In this regard, more questions than answers are provided.  As a 
result, the Islamic finance system is found to have deviated from its 
own ethics and must put some efforts in their regaining. 
In order to gain the ethics of Islamic finance, the article proposes 
some modifications in the current system, with a special attention 
on the process of certification of members of Shari’ah boards before 
their appointment.  In addition, a new system of human resource 
development is proposed, based on comprehensive treatment of 
shortages in both knowledge and skills.  Rating agencies are called 
upon to introduce the Shari’ah aspects in their rating systems and 
specific elements have been proposed in this regard. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION1 
Islamic finance has come of age.  Reaching puberty, as mandated 
by Shari’ah, makes one legally and morally responsible for his 
actions.  That explains our attempt to define ethics of Islamic 
finance and set moral standards to be followed by all concerned in 
the industry. 
However, it is not easy to explain the ethics of Islamic finance, while 
insisting that it has originated from an ethical source that is Islam 
itself.  Doing so implies that those who apply the system are only 
partially honest to its ethical source.  We resolve this issue by 
avoiding the issue of honesty in application of Shari’ah rules and 
highlighting the existence of ethical justifications of the system and 
successes and failures of the system to live up to its own ethics. 
The Harvard/LSE yearly seminar on Islamic finance has made an 
excellent choice of topic for the year 2010, by choosing this topic.  
The reasons are several.  It is about the time to dwell into the ethics 
of Islamic finance, especially after 35 years of practice in several 
countries both in the Orient and the Occident.  Those working 
within the system may have been negligent of the critical ethical 
side.  This would certainly be precipitous, as it could guide the 
whole system to the wrong direction to the extent that it could make 
a full roundabout turn to converge to conventional finance. 
This paper includes several modifications in the author’s paper to 
the Harvard/LSE seminar.  In most places, answers have been 
attached to the questions posed by the previous version.  In 
addition, the practical steps which the author proposes to guide the 
system back to its ethical path have been modified after serious 
rethinking and brain storming with some of my close colleagues 
both in the academia and industry.  The effort in this regard has 
been guided by the desire to modify some of the Islamic finance 
institutional arrangements to make its ethics enforceable.  This is 
undoubtedly the most important side of practicing any system with 
1. The author is the Head of training & financial expert, Emirates Islamic Bank وpresident, International 
Association for Islamic Economics.  The first draft was presented to the yearly joint seminar organized 
by Harvard and London School of Economics.  The author’s is grateful for all those who forwarded 
comments and suggestions towards improving the first draft.  Opinions expressed do not necessarily 
represent the opinions of the Emirates Islamic Bank or the International Association For Islamic 
Economics. 
                                               
embodied ethical standards. 
When it comes to definitions of ethics, and business ethics in 
particular, we have relied in this paper on a quick survey of the 
literature.  We also referred to other writings to explain how 
interest-based lending escaped religions morality in the west.  After 
providing an Islamic perspective of ethics and business ethics, the 
article directs itself to the moral responsibilities of system 
participants.  Naturally there is a great deal of soul searching to do 
and there are tough questions that must be answered by everyone.  
In this regard, more questions than answers are provided.  As a 
result, the Islamic finance system is found to have deviated from its 
own ethics and must put some efforts in their regaining. 
In order to gain the ethics of Islamic finance, the article proposes 
some modifications in the current system, with a special attention 
on the process of certification of members of Shari’ah boards before 
their appointment.  In addition, a new system of human resource 
development is proposed, based on comprehensive treatment of 
shortages in both knowledge and skills.  Rating agencies are called 
upon to introduce the Shari’ah aspects in their rating systems and 
specific elements have been proposed in this regard. 
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BASIC ISSUES: 
WHAT IS ETHICS (VELASQUEZ, 2006)? 
Ethics are defined as “the principles of conduct governing an 
individual or a group. It is the study of morality”.  Ethics therefore 
examines one’s or society’s moral standards to determine whether 
they are applicable to concrete situations and issues. Ethics aims to 
develop a body of moral standards that people consider reasonable 
to hold and acceptable to apply to human choices. 
Business ethics is a form of applied ethics that relates to the moral 
standards applicable to business policies, institutions, and 
behavior. It analyses moral norms and values, and attempts to 
apply conclusions to business institutions and activities  
Business ethics deal with three types of issues: systemic, corporate, 
and individual. The first includes the systemic issues relate to the 
economic, political, legal, and other social systems within which 
businesses operate. The second encompasses the corporate issues 
relate to a particular company. The third combines the individual 
issues relate to a particular individual. 
WHY ETHICS (VELASQUEZ, 2006)? 
Surprisingly, there are people who prefer to ignore ethics in 
business.  Such preference is based on several arguments.  
The first argument claims that businessmen pursue profit 
maximization and not “doing good works”. Presumably, profit 
maximization in perfectly competitive markets maximizes social 
welfare. However, on the one hand, perfectly competitive markets 
are a rarity. Second, the banking industry and Islamic banking in 
particular is not perfectly competitive2. 
The second argument is based on the loyal agent argument, which 
claims that the manager, as a loyal agent, has the duty to advance 
his company’s self-interests.  This assumes that ethics does not 
matter and there are no limits to the manager’s duties.  However, 
2The banking industry is monopolistic by the virtue that monetary authorities place barriers on entry 
in the form of licenses and other requirements. 
                                               
legal and social institutions place limits on agents’ duties.  It also 
assumes that if a manager agrees to serve a firm, then this 
automatically justifies his actions on behalf of the firm. 
The third argument is that to be ethical it is enough for business 
people merely to obey the law. However, while it is generally 
immoral to break the law; the law and ethics are not identical. 
Ethics should be brought into business because ethics should 
govern all voluntary human activities, including business.  
Business activities cannot exist unless the people involved adhere 
to minimal standards of ethics.  In testing whether ethical 
considerations are consistent with the pursuit of profit, results have 
been mixed, but no studies have found a negative correlation. 
When people must choose between cooperating and not cooperating 
in rules or agreements, and when each has more to gain by not 
cooperating, then rational self-interest suggests that people should 
not cooperate. The prisoner’s dilemma, then, seems to show that 
the rational self-interested person should be unethical in business 
when there is something to be gained through unethical behavior.  
However, this conclusion is based on a false assumption. The 
prisoner’s dilemma deals with isolated interactions among people 
who never interact again. This threat of future retaliation makes it 
more rational for the parties in a series of repeated exchanges to 
cooperate than to try to take advantage of each other. Therefore, 
when people deal with each other repeatedly, cooperation is more 
advantageous than continuously trying to take advantage of the 
other party. 
Business interactions are repetitive and ongoing. The prisoner’s 
dilemma argument, then, implies that, over the long run and for the 
most part, it is better to be ethical in business than to be unethical. 
WHY ETHICS NOW? 
A. ZARKA (1997)  
Anas Zarka starts by pointing out that the ethical record of Islamic 
finance is better than that of conventional finance.  Scandals have 
taken place in conventional finance and to a much less extent in 
Islamic finance (Taqwa Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank and Bank Islam 
Malaysia). 
Islamic finance means Shari’ah compliance and ethical investment.  
Both mandate ethics on the industry.  It seems logical to take how 
ethical the behavior of the industry is generally as a yardstick to 
measure Shari’ah compliance. 
Zarka claims that ethics is preferred not only on aesthetic grounds, 
but because ethics are strongly connected to survivability.  Without 
ethical behavior, many Islamic finance contracts would not be 
properly implemented.  Therefore, ethics are necessary for the 
survival of Islamic finance. 
The Islamic finance contracts that require ethics in implementation 
are obvious.  They include Mudaraba (absolute and restricted) and 
Wakala (absolute and restricted).  Those contracts involve a great 
deal of information asymmetry.  Ethical behavior reduces the cost of 
effective monitoring, thereby reducing the risks usually associated 
with information asymmetry, namely adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  In other words, adhering to ethics reduces transactions 
costs and contract-enforcement costs. 
AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ZARKA (1997) 
A. THE THREE IMPERATIVES  
Zarka goes further to distinguish between different levels of ethical 
behavior in Islam.  First he mentions the judicially enforceable, 
Wajibun Qada’an duties.  The “judicially enforceable” is equivalent 
to binding rules of law in most other legal systems. 
The second type of behavior is the Praiseworthy (do’s) and 
blameworthy (do not’s), or in Arabic, Mandub and Makruh: These 
are pure moral duties, which if observed by an individual for the 
sake of Allah, carry Divine reward in the Hereafter. Failing to 
observe Mandub or Makruh carries no punishment. They are sweet 
carrots with no stick insight!  
Mundub and Makruh have further degrees of emphasis which are 
spelt out by Muslim jurists. 
The dilelmma lies in the behavior that is religiously binding, 
Wajibun Diyanatan, because it may not be judicially enforceable but 
still religiously binding.  The “religiously binding” carries sanctions 
on the Day of Judgment, i.e. punishable in the hereafter. This is an 
important intermediate category between the imperatives: Mandub 
and Makruh on the one hand and judicially enforceable on the 
other. 
I may venture to comment on Zarka at this point, to say that 
Muslims must think of some innovative institutional arrangements 
that make the religiously binding also legally binding.  This of 
course would be limited to overt social behavior and cannot be 
expanded to covert individual actions.  For example, you may 
sanction by law drinking in public, but not drinking at home.  The 
sanctioning of the latter behavior is not enforceable without the 
sacrifice of individual privacy. 
B. ISLAMIC ETHICAL VALUES: 
Before attempting to elaborate Islamic ethical values, Zarka stresses 
that they are not different in an essential way from those known to 
humanity from the time of earliest prophets till now.  The common 
standards of goodness known to most human being are shared by 
Muslims.  
Islam revived and articulated the fundamental religious and moral 
traditions that go back to Ibrahim and Noah and many Prophets in 
between, peace be on all of them. 
In the Prophet’s words, Islamic came to emphasize and complete 
moral values. 
C. BUSINESS VALUES: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE: 
Finally, Zarka elaborates four Islamic ethical values that must be 
observed in business: legitimacy, morality of motive, goals beyond 
profit and concern for others. 
1. Legitimacy  
This is first prerequisite to all deeds in Islamic ethics.  One cannot 
be ethical before being legal in the first place.  For instance, Islamic 
Shari’ah considers as morally worthless a charitable contribution to 
good causes from money earned by illegitimate means. 
Abiding by ethics beyond the law is a must.  Zarka emphasizes that 
certain type of behavior must be avoided because they are 
unethical, even if they are not punishable by law. The “purely 
ethical” and the “religiously binding” are two distinct ethical 
imperatives beyond the “judicially enforceable”. 
2. Morality of Motive:  
Muslim jurists have considered whether the legal validity of a 
contract should be suspended if one party knows that the other 
party will depend on this legal transaction to achieve an illegal 
subsequent end.  The classical example is that of (A) selling grapes 
to (B) even though (A) know (B) is very likely to make wine out of the 
grapes.  In such case, the purpose (transforming grapes into wine) 
is immoral.  Shari’ah would render such contract invalid on the 
basis of invalid purpose, even if it is formally valid. 
3. Goals beyond Profits:  
Assume a firm acting within the “judicially enforceable” (legally 
binding) rules of Shari’ah. Is it acceptable for it to be a profit 
maximizer, i.e., to have no other goal but profit? This is a good 
point to ponder. 
To comment on Zarka’s basic question, whether the pursuit of profit 
maximization is ethical or not, we notice that such question has 
been often dealt with in the midst of attacking value-free positive 
economics.  Our concern here is not to build up a critique of 
positive economics, but to focus on the ethical side of behavior.  If 
profit is maximized through ethical behavior, e.g., through 
voluntary exchange of goods and services in openly competitive 
markets, Shari’ah would offer no objections on ethical grounds.   
The obvious example of unethical profit maximization arises when 
the commodities traded are unethical from an Islamic point of view, 
like tobacco, narcotics, alcohol, pork, human trafficking, etc.  The 
need to consider ethics also arises when profit is maximized 
through monopolistic tactics that puts real or imaginary barriers of 
entry.  When profit is maximized through dishonest or predatory 
behavior, the question of ethics becomes more self imposing.   
4.  Concern about Others:   
Concern about the impact of one’s decisions and actions on others 
is at the core of morality and ethics.  Unfortunately, it is also the 
ethical dictum most amenable to extreme and untenable 
interpretations.  
Who those “others” are? And how much of our profits and 
shareholders’ interests should we give up for their sake? This is 
another good point to ponder. 
In response, I must say that the concern for others has two levels.  
The first is the application of the rule of fairness.  The second is the 
application of the rules of equity. 
Fairness implies that we trade with transparency and we would not 
impose on others undue degrees of Ghabn (cheating) or Gharar 
(uncertainty).   Here we can answer the first question posed by 
Zarka, others are the other parties to trading with Muslims.  In this 
regard, we must treat them with fairness.  Belonging to other 
religions, ethnic or racial background is not an excuse for Muslims 
to justify unfair treatment.  Since humans are equal in the sight of 
Allah, they must have equal rights and responsibilities.  This is one 
of the parts of Islam that manifests its universality; Muslims are 
part of humanity and must deal with their human brethren fairly. 
The question of equity is another matter.  If we can define equity as 
keeping the differences between peoples wealth and incomes within 
socially tolerable bounds, the question would be translated into 
redistributive policies to narrow such differences.  What remains is 
to define the socially tolerable bounds.  This will depend on what is 
required to satisfy the basic needs of the poor, including owning 
productive assets to help them earn their own living with dignity. 
D. PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC ETHICS 
Practice of business ethics requires three steps from Zarqa point of 
view. 
1.  Articulation 
This requires collaboration of Shari’ah scholars, business 
practitioners, academicians or scientists in the relevant disciplines. 
An example of good articulation is the Cadbury Report 
recommendations regarding a major issue in corporate governance: 
shareholders rights Vis-à-vis directors. 
Each business sector needs its own ethical guidelines. Investment 
banks and securities dealers, for instance face special ethical 
dilemmas not faced by maritime shippers and electronics 
manufactures. 
2. Facilitation and Cooperation 
To encourage ethical business practices we should reduce the cost 
of ethics to business.   Resistance to ethics will diminish if it can be 
made consistent with the long run interest of economic agents.   
This in fact is one major advantage of religiously-based ethical 
standards, as they carry the promise of reward in the hereafter, 
even if they go unrewarded in this life..  
The ultimate goal is to make ethics profitable, rewarding materially 
not just spiritually.  The second best is to make it less costly. This 
often required some institutional setup. Environmental preservation 
and pollution control provide many examples of the necessity of 
institutions in this regard. 
Muslims and others working in Islamic finance should take part in 
international collective action to facilitate the application of ethical 
standards globally. 
3. Communication 
Two prime lines of communicate are required.  
One is with the business community to learn about the ethical 
dilemmas they face and the practical possibilities for raising the 
ethical standards. This is a prerequisite for the “Articulation” 
imperative.  
The second line of communications is with the rest of the world. 
Muslims can contribute towards forging a “Global Ethic”, we 
learning much from the rest of the world. 
E. AXIOMS OF ISLAMIC ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY: (BEEKUN, 1996) 
1. Ethics is defined as a set of moral principles that distinguish 
what is right from wrong, and in an Islamic context, the Qur'anic 
term khuluq is closest to it.  Also, some other terms referenced 
from Qur'an describing the concept of good are Khayr (goodness), 
Berr (righteousness), Qist (equity), and 'Adl (equilibrium and 
justice). 
2. Five axioms of Islamic ethical philosophy 
2.1. Unity, derived from the absolute oneness of God, 
2.2. Equilibrium, derived from justice 
2.3. Free Will, based on authority of man given through 
Istikhlaf (trusteeship) 
2.4. Responsibility, based on Istikhlaf 
2.5. Benevolence 
F. PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS CONDUCT IN ISLAMIC: (TANRI, 1997) 
Tanri provides few principles of business conduct derived from 
Islamic teachings: freedom, justice, efficiency, judgment based on 
due diligence, leniency, the service motive, and consciousness of 
God. 
Business conduct in Islam is founded on two fundamental 
principles, namely freedom and justice.  Freedom in matters of 
business transactions envisages: the right of owning property, the 
legality of trade, and the presence of mutual consent.  Mutual 
consent, however, can exist only when there is volition, honesty and 
truthfulness over-against coercion, fraud and lying. 
Nevertheless, constructive criticism should not be avoided; and  
Leaders should strive to create an atmosphere of free thinking, 
healthy exchange of ideas, criticism, and mutual advice so that the 
followers feel comfortable in discussing matters on interest to the 
group. 
Justice in matters of business transactions includes: fulfillment of 
promises (pacts and contracts verbal and written), exactness in 
weights and measures (specifications) in all business related items 
including work, wages and payment, and labor movement, 
truthfulness, sincerity and honesty are ordained, While lying and 
cheating are condemned, 
Efficiency means that jobs should be carried out without any lapse 
or omission, with best planning and to be the best of their efficiency 
and competency.  This requires selection on the basis of merit and 
competency for the job. 
Investigation and verification (due diligence) is required before 
decision or judgment making 
Finally, there are certain manners that must be followed for ethical 
conduct, especially leniency, which constitutes the foundation and 
core of good manners.  Leniency includes politeness, forgiveness, 
removal of hardship, and compensation.  
Service motive means that in all business activities, Muslim should 
intend, to provide a needed service to his/her own community and 
the humanity at large. Consciousness of Allah implies that a 
Muslim is required to be mindful of Allah even when engrossed in 
business engagements. 
  
INTEREST RATE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, OR HOW REBA 
ESCAPED RELIGIOUS ETHICS IN 
THE WEST, LEWISON (1999) 
Taking interest on a loan was considered inherently evil and 
immoral. Earliest civilizations showed ill feeling toward interest.  It 
was seen as intolerable to the Greek philosophers,. Aristotle held 
that money's purpose was solely as a medium of exchange; money 
was a sterile thing, incapable of bearing "fruit". Taking interest 
involved gain from money itself, instead of from the activities of 
exchange which money was meant to facilitate.   
Its prohibition was prominent in the Bible3.  However, the 
prohibition of interest was not universally observed, even during 
biblical times. Early Christianity maintained its antipathy of usury4. 
The Catholic Church in 325 C. E., during the Council of Nicea, 
passed a canon prohibiting the taking of interest by clerics, citing 
Psalm 15. For the following five hundred years, the Church 
intermittently attacked usury. Between the ninth and thirteenth 
centuries, the Church imposed a new string of harsh restrictions on 
usurers, ranging from excommunication to the equating of usury to 
robbery, to the prohibition of all usury in 1139 by the Second 
Lateran Council. 
Yet, wherever there was trade, the charging of interest on loans 
continued. One justification was the peculiar ambiguity of 
Deuteronomy 23:20-215. This ambiguity led to various attempts to 
skirt usury prohibitions.  
The scholastics believed that extra charges for late payment were 
justifiable, while charges to cover a lender's opportunity costs were 
viewed as unjustifiable.  
Distinctions were made between loans for consumption and loans 
2. 3 Exodus 22:24, Leviticus 25:35?37, Deuteronomy 23:20-21, Ezekiel (18:13), Psalms 15:5, Proverbs 
28:8, Nehemiah 5:7. 
3. 4 The injunction in Luke (6:35) to "lend freely, hoping nothing in return." 
4. 5 On the one hand, it prohibits the taking of interest from one's brother. On the other hand, it permits 
the taking of interest from a "foreigner". 
                                               
for production, with usury restrictions being placed only on the 
former.  
Another notable way to avoid interest prohibitions was through 
foreign money changing activities that took advantage of varying 
rates of exchange. 
The universal prohibition on usury imposed by the Catholic Church 
in 1139 contributed to the conditions that led to widespread Jewish 
involvement in money lending in medieval Europe.  
Severe economic restrictions (e.g., exclusion from craft guilds) 
prevented Jewish pursuit of other trades, and the Jews remained 
outside the Church edict.  
Some biblical verses permitted money lending at interest to non-
Jews under Jewish law6. Many Jewish legalists interpret those 
verses as a positive commandment to take interest on loans to 
Gentiles7.  Talmudic sources qualify the permissibility of taking 
interest from Gentiles by limiting it to the level required for 
subsistence if there are no other means of survival.  
Jews were not the only moneylenders during this period, but 
evidence suggests that Church constraints on usury had a decided 
dampening effect on Christian money lending. 
Feelings against usury and Jewish usurers were intense. Usury sat 
near the height of all social evils. Many felt that the biblical 
prohibition upon usury between Jews provided evidence that usury 
was a universal sin. It was further believed that Jews should be 
forced to include non-Jews as "brothers" so that the Christian ideal 
of universal brotherhood could be realized.   
Numerous cases of violence toward medieval Jewish moneylenders 
were recorded. Immediately following the massacre of the Jews at 
York, England in 1190, the conspirators went directly to the place 
where the records of debt were kept and destroyed them. 
Jewish prominence in money lending waned when many Jewish 
communities were taxed out of business by various civil authorities. 
Jewish money lending activities continued, however, with the 
ascendancy of the Court Jew, whose fortunes rose and fell with 
5. 6 Deuteronomy (23:20-21) 
6. 7 Including the famous rabbi Moses Maimonides [1135-1204] 
                                               
those of the royal administration he served. Jewish banking 
continued into the 19th and 20th centuries with the rise of 
merchant banking families of both Europe and the United States. 
The German Reformation initially caused only a subtle change in 
the general attitude toward usury, but its influence later grew to 
revolutionary proportions. The final steps toward the acceptability 
of usury were not taken until John Calvin's (1509-1564) who 
enabled the modern attitude toward interest.  
Calvin broke with the Greek philosophers and with earlier Church 
teachings by proclaiming that, in fact, money was not sterile and 
unable to yield its own fruits, at least not in the case of loans for 
production purposes. Calvin paved the way from a "tribal 
brotherhood," where usury was forbidden, to a "universal 
brotherhood," where it was more or less entirely permitted.  
Eventually, as the market economy in Europe grew more 
sophisticated after the Renaissance, arguments within Protestant 
nations changed from whether usury was permitted, to how much 
was a reasonable rate. These changes in attitude were buttressed 
by then-new classical economic arguments regarding issues such 
as risk and the time value of money from the likes of John Locke. 
Not until the 19th century, however, did the Catholic Church finally 
soften its position on usury. The Church ruled that "... the faithful 
who lend money at moderate rates of interest are not to be 
disturbed, provided they are willing to abide by any future decisions 
of the Holy See." 
However, some restrictions on interest rates remain to this day.  
Many U.S. States restrict permissible interest rates on consumer 
retail loans to something close to twenty percent. More than one 
American state has had usury limits incorporated into its 
constitution.  
Arkansas' constitution of 1874 limited permissible interest rates in 
that state to only ten percent. Arkansas still had not effectively 
changed its usury law.  
Using national loan market data from January 1983 to August 
1989, it was estimated that 60% of short-term, fixed rate small 
loans (between $1000 and $24000) made in the U.S. during that 
period were negotiated at rates above the legal maximum in 
Arkansas. 
It can no longer be argued that usury is much of an ethical issue in 
the modern American marketplace. While federal and state 
limitations on interest rates do exist, banks and other financial 
institutions have on the whole been left alone to charge what 
markets will bear. If moral objections are raised at all, they are to 
the taking of excessive amounts of interest rather than the taking of 
interest per se. This is, in fact, the meaning conveyed through 
modern use of the term "usury", excessive interest rates.  
It is precisely the people in the most precarious economic positions 
that are paying the most "usurious" rates, which is ironic since the 
biblical injunction is explicit in its condemnation of any interest 
charges to the poor. 
  
  
COMBINING ISLAMIC ETHICS 
WITH ISLAMIC FINANCE 
MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Islamic finance claim to ethics is based on two grounds: justice and 
Pareto optimality. Charging interest on a medium of exchange 
involves several injustices.  First, it allows lenders to claim wealth 
that is not their but belongs to the whole society.  Second, the poor 
would suffer in an interest-based system.  Third, it would cause the 
whole society to suffer from wanting economic efficiency as Pareto 
optimality would be absent with a positive interest rate, which 
deprives society from a higher level of welfare.  In addition, the 
interest-based finance causes definite harmful effects to economies 
all over the world.    
I. IS IT JUST TO CHARGE INTEREST ON LOANS (AL-
JARHI 1983-2007)? 
Money admittedly serves as a unit of account, a store of value and a 
medium of exchange.  Any commodity can serve as a unit of 
account or a store of value.  Only money can serve as a medium of 
exchange. 
Being a medium of exchange depends on general acceptability.  
Even with fiat money, if general acceptability is lost, money ceases 
to function as a medium of exchange.  A practical example is what 
happened to the Deutsche Mark during hyperinflation associated 
with World War I.   The value of transactions services provided by 
money is therefore created by the whole society.  Morally, no one 
should charge for such services, except the society as a whole.   
Part of the money supply (currency in circulation) is issued by the 
central bank (a government-owned entity) to lend to government 
and to banks (generally private enterprises) at a rate of interest.  
Lending to the government at interest does not raise any ethical 
issues, as the net income of the central bank is plowed back into 
government budget.  The ultimate effect of such action is that the 
government lends itself and charges itself interest.  But lending to 
banks and the public would involve unjustifiable redistribution of 
wealth between the government, banks shareholders and public as 
ultimate borrowers. 
The larger part of the money is created by banks, thanks to the 
fractional reserve ratio, and lent to the public.  The net result goes 
to the coffers of bank shareholders.  They accumulate wealth at the 
expense of the public, and this redistribution in favor of 
shareholders appears to be unethical.  
Banks can appropriate such wealth at the expense of the public 
because of monopoly rights afforded them by the government and 
manifested by the central bank licensing process.  
In addition, when an individual lends money and charges interest, 
he is selling something that he does not own (transactions services 
of money) and usurping the rights of the whole society that gave 
general acceptability of money.  It is therefore immoral and unjust.  
The redistribution of wealth from the public to banks and to money 
lenders can be significant.  Let us assume that money broadly 
defined   (domestic liquidity) is about 30 percent of GDP.  Let us 
also assume that 40 percent is currency and demand deposits 
(narrow money) and the rest is quasi money (time deposits).  If 
banks were to gain 2 percent per annum, as an interest-rate 
differential between the borrowing and lending rates, on quasi 
money loaned, the wealth they appropriate to themselves is about 
0.36 percent of GDP per annum, which would be equal $3.6 billion 
dollars a year in a country with the economic size of the UAE. 
Individuals may hold monetary balances.  Their use of money as a 
unit of account or a store of value is their exclusive right.  However, 
their use of money as a medium of exchange depends of the general 
acceptability that is drawn from the society as a whole.  Therefore, 
they are not entitled to lend money to others (who expectedly would 
use it as a medium of exchange) at a rate of interest, as they would 
be appropriating to themselves what belongs to society as a whole. 
This injustice is one of the reasons provided by Al-Jarhi for 
proposing 100 percent reserves on demand deposits. 
II. THE PLIGHT OF THE AMERICAN POOR AS AN 
EXAMPLE, LEWISON (1999) 
"Fringe banking" institutions charge the highest rates of interest 
and are often the only source of credit for the poor. 
As many as 60 to 70 million adults in the U.S. do not have any type 
of bank account (Rowe, Jr., 1993). Members of this group are likely 
to be poor and must pay for all of their financial transactions, from 
telephone bills to car payments, in cash.  
Lack of bank accounts typically denies access to simple consumer 
credit services. It precludes one from being granted access to simple 
bank loans, credit cards, and other forms of consumer financial 
services. 
Consumers with low incomes or poor credit histories are frequently 
denied access to many mainstream consumer credit sources and 
often find themselves in the same borrowing class as those 
consumers who lack even a basic checking account. 
"Fringe banking" includes institutions that lie outside of the 
traditional mainstream of the consumer financing business, like: 
1. Check cashing establishments,  
2. Subprime mortgage lenders,  
3. Lay-away plans,  
4. Rent-to-own stores,  
5. "Title lenders", "payday lenders", and  
6. Pawnbrokers, numbers rackets, and lotteries 
Such institutions are the usurers of the modern age. They charge 
rates of interest that are many time greater than typical market 
rates, and their clientele come mainly from the ranks of the poor 
and underemployed.  They routinely charge their customers 
annualized interest rates between 100 and 200 percent. 
It is often argued that lending the poor, like credit cards involve 
greater risks, justifying charging higher interest rates. However, 
credit card rates are much lower than pawn shop rates, running 
closer to 20-30 percent interest on an annual basis, or close to one 
hundred percent less than pawnshop rates on average.  Pawnshop 
loans are secured by pledged collateral, thereby drastically reducing 
the risk to the lender. Rent-to-own stores and payday lenders 
charge still higher rates of implicit interest while taking on even less 
risk than pawnbrokers do. 
In rent-to-own stores, a customer pays a weekly fee, usually less 
than twenty dollars, for a home appliance. If the payments continue 
for a specified period, typically 18 months, the customer can keep 
the item. The store provides for maintenance, but, customers are 
liable for insurance premiums, delivery charges, late fees, and other 
charges.. In the end, customers pay 350-450 percent more for the 
item than cash retail payment. After a period of time, the renter 
becomes psychologically trapped into the agreement due to the high 
sunk costs, without ability to build equity in the asset over time. 
Failure to continue payments simply leads to repossession without 
reimbursement. 
III. INTEREST RATE AND EFFICIENCY LOSSES (AL-
JARHI 1983-2007) 
In the second half of the last century, Milton Friedman and Paul 
Samuelson came forward with the observation that the cost of 
producing real balances in a system of fiat money is zero at the 
margin.  In order to reach optimality, the price of money (the rate of 
interest) must be zero.  To reach that goal, the economy must be 
deflated at a rate equal to the real rate of interest.   
Curiously, Samuelson noticed that the goal of optimality cannot be 
reached within laissez faire.  This could be interpreted as the need 
to change the structure of the financial system.  However, Friedman 
introduced his rule (which is the same as Samuelson’s, but the 
name of Friedman persisted), which has been taken as applicable to 
the current system. 
The rationale behind Friedman rule is two sided.  On the one hand, 
optimality requires that equality between marginal cost of 
producing real balances and price of money (the rate of interest).  
On the other hand, putting a positive price on money would lead 
trading agents to economize on the use of money as a means of 
exchange through the substitution of real resources for money in 
transactions.  Such substitution runs contrary to optimality, as 
total output can be increased with less substitution  . 
The proposal to reach a zero nominal rate of interest created a lot of 
discussion in the economics academia, but failed to stir concern in 
the banking community.  Central banks took no notice of Friedman 
rule, indicating perhaps that they thought it impractical. 
Discussion ensued later about the zero-bound rate of interest and 
whether it implied a liquidity trap.  Further discussion examined 
the Friedman rule in overlapping generations’ models in contrast 
with the infinitely lived representative agents’ models.   Others 
studied the rule in models with and without non-distortionary 
taxes. 
Instead of calling on people to lend each other at a zero interest 
rate, the interest rate is forced by the application of Friedman Rule 
to take a zero value or to move asymptotically towards zero, 
convincing people to hold sufficient real balances in order to benefit 
from the deflation reward on money.  Lending at a zero interest rate 
is a case of charity and cannot be used to finance business 
investment.  The latter deflationary policy depends on persuading 
central bankers.  Between the two, we can expect no institutional 
reform of the monetary system. 
Islamic finance provides 12 contracts through which money can be 
channeled directly to economic activities (investment, production, 
trade and consumption).  This eliminates the first source of 
injustice related to selling the transactions services of money for a 
price, while it is the property of the whole society.  It also eliminates 
the third sources of injustice which comes from the several harms 
imposed on economies worldwide by the system of conventional 
finance.   
The second source referring to the share of the poor cannot be 
eliminated without a conscientious effort to provide microfinance to 
the poor on the side of Islamic banks, coupled by giving them a role 
in disposing of the share of the poor in Zakah proceeds through 
building up micro projects and giving their management and (later 
on) their title to the poor.  
IV. OTHER HARMFUL EFFECTS OF INTEREST-BASED 
FINANCE (AL-JARHI, 2004) 
Interest-based finance has serious negative macroeconomic effects.  
This implies that those who practice conventional finance inflict 
serious harms on the national economy, causing serious losses to 
the society as a whole.  This in itself should be considered unjust, 
and classified as unethical behavior, hence. 
A. INSTABILITY 
The interest-based banking system is inherently unstable.  Banks 
liabilities are classical loans that are absolutely guaranteed.  Bank 
assets meanwhile are subject to several risks, including risk of 
default.  If significant failure happens on the asset side, a bank 
would fall down, and this may cause a run on banks. 
Lending based on interest has lead to the creation of an integrated 
debt market which has been a source of instability and contagion.  
Hot money (short-term funds) can enter and exit to and from the 
bonds market in any country at will, causing repercussions with 
ramifications in this country as well others closely related through 
trade and financial flows.  
B. RISKS OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
Interest-based lending has an intrinsic problem of information 
asymmetry.  The only exception is the case of universal banking 
that is common in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, where banks can 
take equity and trade (like Islamic banks), and thereby reducing 
information asymmetry.   
Information asymmetry leads to risks of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  Such risks result in under-financing the economy, with 
losses in output and employment.  
C. DISORIENTATION FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCE  
Interest-based finance is lending-based, i.e., it allocates financial 
resources according to lending criteria (ability to pay, collateral, 
etc.).  This deprives projects with good development potential from 
finance.   
Economic development would have insufficient attention and 
therefore, the national economy remains lagging behind.   
D. SOCIOECONOMIC DISINTEGRITY  
Conventional finance can be likened to a spectator’s game where 
few skilled players stay in the playground and a big crowd watches 
from outside.   
Risk is known to be one of the most important ingredients of 
making investment.  Those who finance investment share a good 
part of the risk involved with those who carry out actual investment 
activities.  Conventional finance leaves risk to be borne by 
specialists.  Banks and financial institutions provide investors with 
loans guaranteed by collateral.  In this fashion, they keep 
themselves apart from certain kinds of risk, like those attached to 
production, marketing and distribution, and limit their exposure to 
risk related to collateral only. 
We can therefore notice that risk as well as decision-making is 
borne by a small number of concerned people.  Risk sharing is not 
balanced by sharing in decision-making.  The components of society 
are placed apart into two groups: risk bearers, spectators and 
decision makers.  As the three groups are disjoint, when the 
economy hits a disaster, it acts like an old car in a head-on 
collision; each part goes its own way.  
E. UNSUSTAINABILITY  
Conventional debt has certain characteristics that could place 
debtors in difficulties if circumstances do not allow them to repay in 
time.   Interest is usually calculated on the outstanding balance of 
debt, usually compounded annually and sometimes at shorter 
intervals.  Delinquent debtors are often subjected to penalty rates of 
interest, which are higher than regular rates.  Such higher rates are 
usually applied to all outstanding balance regardless of which part 
has been delayed in payment.  It is not uncommon to find 
borrowers who end up paying debt service that is many folds the 
original principal they borrowed.  This is common in the case of 
credit cards, where problems of indebtedness are enormous and 
still linger despite successive attempts to reform the system.   
It is also symptomatic of developing countries debt, as they 
continue to face debt problems that sometimes reach crisis levels.  
Creditor countries and institutions have often sought to find ways 
and mechanisms to provide debt relief to debtor countries.  Despite 
continuous efforts, the debt problems faced by developing countries 
seem to be ever-present.   
We can therefore conclude that interest based financing lacks a 
great deal of sustainability.  Creditors have to stop every few years 
to give debtors relief in terms of rescheduling and forgiveness.  
Sometimes this also includes floating low quality debt at lower 
market value and swapping it with equity.  The system has 
demonstrated unsustainability several times. 
  
MODERN INTEREST-FREE 
FINANCE: HOW PEOPLE EXERCISE 
THEIR HUMAN AND RELIGIOUS 
ETHICS 
I. JEWISH FINANCE (LEWISON 1999) 
In Judaism Lending money to the poor is a more meritorious deed 
than charity. Some Jewish scholars considered the granting of a 
free loan to be the very highest form of charity. This applies not only 
money, but to virtually any item. One should lend tools, food, or 
anything that his or her neighbor needs.  
There are rules pertaining to free loans in Judaism, covering issues 
as diverse as which potential borrowers are given priority, what the 
proper amount to lend is, and the issues regarding the security 
pledges for loans.  There is also a rule to repay a loan, witnesses, 
guarantors, interest, and even what a borrower is permitted to do 
with borrowed funds.  
Free loan societies are an important institution in the Jewish world. 
Yad Sarah (Hand of Sarah) is an organization in Jerusalem that 
lends medical equipment of families that cannot afford to make the 
expensive purchases. Other Jewish free loan associations exist to 
lend everything from plates and silverware for large functions, 
power tools, apartments, books and audio cassettes, and even baby 
pacifiers at all times, day or night.  
Nearly every city with a large Jewish population in North America 
has a free loan society, and these operate within strict biblical 
guidelines, charging no interest for their loans.  Their importance in 
fostering Jewish entrepreneurship in the U.S. has been 
documented. 
II. OTHER TYPES OF POOR-FREE OREINTED FINANCE 
(LEWISON 1999) 
A. IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Community-based credit bodies provide a possible escape from 
usury for the poor. Such community-based credit schemes have 
succeeded in the form of microlending agencies in India and 
Bangladesh.   The idea of microlending has begun to catch on and 
is expanding throughout the U.S.  Some suggest that free loans are 
at least a partial answer to a host of poverty problems, as evidenced 
by a free loan experiment conducted with a group of poor female 
borrowers.  
Small farmers in many countries have long been denied access to 
formal credit because banks charge high administrative fees for 
each loan, making access to small-scale loans prohibitively 
expensive.  Information gaps exist because banks have no 
mechanisms for selecting small farmers who are most likely to 
succeed. While some formal microcredit schemes have become 
popular, informal microlending continued to be important. 
In Bangladesh formal microlending works side-by-side with 
informal schemes. Farmers using formal loans and those using 
informal loans are credit constrained; they substitute labor for 
other inputs that require cash at the beginning of the season, 
creating inefficiencies in production. Such credit constraint is 
actually milder for the informal borrowers; the implicit shadow price 
of working capital is substantially higher for formal than informal 
loans. 
Even with formal microlending, access to credit remains a problem 
for small farmers.  Informal remain more successful in identifying 
those small farmers that are most likely to make the best use of the 
borrowed funds.  Although formal microcredit, contrary to 
traditional formal lending, avoids high administrative fees it does 
not solve the problem of selecting successful borrowers. Informal 
lenders have an information advantage. 
B. IN THE USA (SERVON, 2006) 
Peer group lending programs in the United States adapt 
methodologies first used in developing countries and apply them 
domestically to benefit low-income communities (Hung, 2003). 
Based on surveys of programs across the country, loan delinquency 
is primarily a function of context, especially the credit risk of 
borrowers and time. However, evidence suggests that the payoff 
structure and peer group actions have discouraged some loan 
default (Hung, 2003). 
The U.S. microenterprise finance started in mid 1980’s.  It provide 
business training, small amounts of credit ($35,000 or less) or both 
to businesses with five or fewer employees. They approach 500 
programs.   and had several important influences including the 
growth and development of the international microenterprise field 
and the women’s economic development movement.  
For the most part, U.S. microenterprise development organizations 
(MDOs) were initiated as locally based responses to a need for better 
economic options, particularly for people who lacked access to 
mainstream financial institutions. As a result, a majority of 
programs have targeted what are often categorized as 
disadvantaged groups such as women, public assistance recipients, 
displaced workers, and people of color. 
The environment in which they operate is characterized by greater 
sophistication, professionalization, and infrastructure but also by a 
challenging funding environment and a lack of appropriate 
incentives to move forward.  
Initial goals of scale and sustainability remain elusive because of 
several problems, including increased competition, and difficulty in 
reaching the target market. Most microenterprise organizations are 
busy struggling to find the next dollar rather than thinking smart.  
Some argue that the American microenterprise requires significant 
changes to survive, including restructuring the industry, 
encouraging innovation, creating a legitimate accreditation process, 
and adopting standards.  
Some programs have begun to take important steps in appropriate 
directions—merging with other organizations and diversifying their 
product lines, but these programs are the exception rather than the 
rule. Other programs, including some of the field’s early leaders, are 
shrinking in the face of the above challenges. 
C. IN EUROPE (KRITIKOS, KNEIDING AND GERMELMANN, 2009) 
In industrialized countries, with their highly developed banking 
systems, there has been ongoing debate on whether an uncovered 
demand for microlending services exists. A pilot study exploring 
customer preferences for microlending products in Germany found 
high demand for microlending and identified potential recipients as 
retail and foreign business owners, and persons who had previously 
received private loans. 
III. ISLAMIC FINANCE 
A. PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 
The Islamic finance industry has been noted to be thriving and 
gaining more momentum all over the world.  Some capitals have 
distinguished themselves as potential international centers for 
Islamic finance, including Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, London, 
Bahrain and Dubai.     
Figures have not been tallied on a global scale, but the author has 
been following up aggregates in the Gulf region. 
Islamic finance assets have been growing at more than 30 percent 
per annum on the average during 2000-2008, compared to 16 
percent for conventional finance.  The market share of the industry 
measured by assets increased from 7 percent in 2000 to 17 percent 
in 2008.  Such share has been growing at about 11 percent per 
annum on the average.  By the end of 2008 the industry managed 
$228 billion of assets. 
Our estimates based on a conservative scenario that counts for the 
2008-1010 slowdown indicate that the share of the industry in 
assets may approach 40 percent and its total assets may come close 
to $2 trillion by 2020 in the Gulf. 
Islamic finance in the Gulf has been growing faster in assets, 
deposits, equity and profits.  Its customers include a high 
percentage of non-Muslims, especially in Malaysia and the UAE. 
However, Islamic finance is not free of serious challenges.  Some of 
them are: 
7. Shortage of human resources, 
8. Problems of governance in Shari’ah boards: 
9. Prevalence of a small number of non-Shari’ah scholars in 
Shari’ah board membership 
10. Some members who have claim to scholarship have graduated 
from low profile universities and have no track record of teaching 
and research. 
11. Most Shari’ah boards do not have an economic advisor sitting 
on the board. 
Gresham’s law is clearly manifested in Board membership; the least 
qualified as Shari’ah scholar has the highest number of board 
membership.  Increasing prevalence of products of ill repute, which 
are conventional products marketed as Islamic products.  Examples 
are: 
1. Tawarruq, through multiple sale and Salam contracts, 
2. Eina-based products 
3. Risk trading products, based on swaps. 
4. Securitization of debt and cash, 
5. The challenges faced by Islamic finance pose serious questions of 
ethics on the side of Shari’ah board memberships. 
 
  
SOME ASPECTS OF ETHICS OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCE AS A SYSTEM: 
SYSTEMIC ETHICS 
I. ETHICS OF SYSTEM EVOLVEMENT: 
Islamic finance is still the smaller part of the whole finance 
industry.  It is not expected to be able to provide Halal (fully 
Shari’ah compliant finance, based on judgment free from taking 
licenses and making compromises on the basis of social interest, 
Maslaha, or dire necessity, Darura.) in an environment inundated 
by conventional finance practices.  Therefore, Islamic finance 
structures its products on the basis of Shari’ah compliance that is 
marred by taking licenses and compromises, hoping that it would 
gradually approach Halal objectives 
In application of Shari’ah rules in the field of finance, we do not 
expect to instantly reach the Halal goal instantly, but we may have 
to reach it gradually.  On such course, several licenses and 
compromises may be taken, depending on circumstances.   
This implies that we must accept the fact that all Fatwas remain 
provisional, until licenses and compromises are reduced to 
absolutely unavoidable minimum. Until we reach that goal, there 
would be several midcourse corrections. 
However, once a fatwa is issued, it remains unchanged.  For 
example, the structure of Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek has not 
changed since its inception, despite the many Shari’ah issues 
regarding the licenses and compromises related to it.  Another 
example is the leverage rates allowed for holding and trading 
stocks. 
The lack of continuous gradual adjustment towards the goal of 
Halal means that Islamic finance could stay in place forever.  It 
could even converge to conventional finance in the medium run. 
II. ETHICS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF SYSTEM 
PARTICIPANTS: 
A. SYSTEM FUND PROVIDERS 
1. System fund providers are shareholders and depositors. 
2. Shareholders take the responsibility of appointing management 
and Shari’ah board members. 
3. Their choice of Shari’ah board membership involves a degree of 
Shari’ah arbitrage, which brings Gresham’s law into play. 
4. Regulators have not been willing in most cases to set and apply 
governance rules for Shari’ah boards.  This increases the moral 
responsibilities of shareholders. 
5. Investment and saving depositors should concern themselves 
about Shari’ah board membership and the Shari’ah quality of 
finance products issued using their resources. 
6. Full transparency regarding Shari’ah boards’ credentials should 
be exercised.  
7. Investment and saving depositors share the risk with 
shareholders.  Yet they have no voice. 
8. Notably, Mudaraba and Wakala contracts, which are the basis 
for providing saving and investment deposits, do not allow 
sharing in management, but they allow monitoring.  Regulators 
here must step in and impose reasonable schemes to keep 
depositors informed about investment conditions in the bank. 
III. SYSTEM-FUNDS USERS: ENLIGHTENED USE OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Fund users should consider the following aspects: 
1. The available alternative finance structures, compared with 
regard to: 
1.1. Shari’ah compliance of finance structures 
1.2. Involvement of products of ill repute. 
1.3. Treatment of temporary insolvency 
2. When using PLS modes of finance, sufficient incentives should be 
given to fund users to encourage transparency, disclosure of 
profits, and avoidance of moral hazard. 
IV. SYSTEM-REGULATORS 
1. Unique treatment of Islamic finance 
1.1. Are regulations suited for Islamic or conventional 
finance? 
1.2. Does the financial institution have internal processes to 
guarantee? 
1.2.1. Financial solvency, 
1.2.2. Rational investment decisions 
1.2.3. Correct Shari’ah rule? 
2. Corporate governance rules: 
2.1. Can the management carry out Islamic finance? 
2.2. Are members of the Shari’ah board qualified? 
2.3. Has the function of product structuring, development 
and documentation been assigned to a specific department. 
2.4. The qualifications and size of Shari’ah auditing unit and 
its independence  
3. How will the role of “lender of last resort” be exercised towards 
Islamic banks?  
4. How much of the banks resources are recycled through the 
London Metal Exchange? 
V. PROVISION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE PRODUCTS 
THROUGH CONVENTIONAL AGENCIES 
1. Moral justification of mixing Islamic and conventional finance: 
rules and safeguards 
2. How separate the sources and uses of funds are? 
VI. ETHICS OF SHARI’AH SCHOLARS 
1. Optimal qualifications for Shari’ah board membership: 
1.1. Odd number of Shari’ah scholars 
1.1.1. What is a Shari’ah scholar? 
1.1.1.1. PhD in Shari’ah from a highly ranked university 
1.1.1.2. Track record of published research and teaching 
1.2. An economist as member/advisor 
1.2.1. What is an economist? 
1.2.1.1. PhD in monetary and financial economics from a 
highly ranked university, 
1.2.1.2. Track record of published research and teaching, 
1.2.1.3. Banking and finance experience. 
2. Misrepresentation of qualifications 
2.1. Can one be the judge of his own qualifications? 
2.1.1. Obviously not; a third party is required to make 
judgment based on expertise. 
2.2. Can the market be the judge? 
2.2.1. The market can be a judge to market-related skills 
and knowledge, especially in the field of management.  
2.2.2. For jobs related to giving “objective judgments, 
based on Shari’ah rules, the market can be a bad judge as 
those who charge less for their services and are willing to 
provide more convenient opinions from the point of view of 
shareholders, will be chosen over the more knowledgeable.  
In other words, if market judgments were to be relied 
upon, Gresham’s Law would take effect.    
2.3. Founders of schools of thought did not have a PhD?  
2.3.1. This argument is often forwarded by unqualified 
members of Shari’ah boards in order to call for reliance on 
market judgment.   
2.3.2. History tells us that founders of schools of thought 
had to travel from one end of the vast Islamic world to 
another in order to learn from widely dispersed scholars 
and be certified by them, before sitting to teach 
themselves.   
2.3.3. University education and PhD programs are the 
modern substitute for old education system.  It is less 
expensive, and more reliable, especially in a world with 
less honesty in the field of science.   
2.4. How many Shari’ah board can one be a member of? 
2.4.1. Shari’ah boards should meet monthly.  A one day 
meeting would presumably require at least three days of 
preparation.  This means that the maximum number of 
meeting that can be attended usefully is 4 to 5 per month.   
2.4.2. If a scholar wishes to spend all of his working time 
as a Shari’ah board member, foregoing vacations and 
leisure time, he can be a member of a maximum of 5 
Shari’ah boards.   
2.4.3. If a Shari’ah member is overly efficient, because of 
his vast experience and availability of a team of assistance 
to support his efforts, we can multiply the above number 
by 2 or even 3.  In other words the maximum number that 
is humanly possible would be between 10 and 15 Shari’ah 
board memberships. 
3. Who should pay for members of the Shari’ah boards? 
3.1. This point has been raised, based on the impression that 
the management pays Shari’ah boards.   
3.2. However, shareholders are the ones who set 
remuneration to Shari’ah board members.   
3.3. However, if shareholders are the ultimate judge on 
Shari’ah board members, i.e., they are not subjected to 
rigorous certification by a third party before appointment, a 
conflict of interest arises. 
3.4. Conflict of interest 
3.5. When Shari’ah board members are both certified and 
appointed by shareholders, on the expectations that they 
would provide lenient judgments, the conflict of interest 
arises. 
3.6. Shari’ah board members would find it necessary to make 
judgments most preferred by shareholders in order to keep 
their standing as (market certified) scholars and members of 
Shari’ah boards. 
3.7. The conflict of interest increases with the number of 
Shari’ah board membership, as the Shari’ah board member 
puts less effort in formulating his judgment and uses 
shareholders preference as a thump rule for making 
decisions.  
  
REGAINING THE ETHICAL 
STANDARDS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
A. HAS ISLAMIC FINANCE LIVED OP TO ITS ETHICS? 
1. The answer is mixed.   
2. On the positive side, we find many Islamic banks that adhere to 
Shari’ah rules with both honesty and creativity.  They have 
adorned their Shari’ah boards with highly qualified intellectuals 
and provided them with sufficient support to enable them to 
structure proper Shari’ah-compliant products.  They have 
shunned away from products of ill repute.  In addition, they have 
been successful business-wise, proving that business success 
does not conflict with ethics. 
3. This represents only full-half of the cup.  The other half is stuffed 
with banks that raise the flag of Shari’ah paying lip service to it, 
but staff their Shari’ah boards with non-experts and unqualified 
self-styled persons who are bend to make money through posing 
as Shari’ah scholars.  They are known for dismissal of the 
resolutions of the prestigious Fiqh academies, declaring 
themselves as profits of new products which they have carefully 
provided with Islamic attire, but in true essence they are all 
conventional products.   
4. Regulators have contributed to this product-confusion by staying 
ambivalent towards the corporate governance of Islamic banks.  
They have allowed persons who consider the differences between 
Islamic and conventional finance as only in nomenclature.  Such 
people may be good conventional bankers with conventional 
finance orientation and with total inability to understand the 
essence of Islamic finance.  Their mix-up in perception results in 
a worse mix-up in application.  The Islamic finance institutions 
they manage appear part Islamic and part conventional, hence. 
5. Furthermore, regulators stay uninvolved in the corporate 
governance of Shari’ah boards.  This is most astonishing, as 
Shari’ah boards in Islamic banks represent the first layer of 
regulation, while central banks represent the second and final 
layer.  This appears to be rarely understood by banking 
regulators.   
6. Islamic finance quiet often works without a banking law.  It often 
has to work under regulations that hinder its strict following of 
Shari’ah.  Regulators do not only disengage from proper 
supervision of Islamic finance, they go further to put all possible 
hindrances.  
7. Therefore, there is an increasing apprehension that the Islamic 
finance industry has seen converging towards conventional 
finance; and that the rate of conversion is increasing and could 
ultimately push the industry into the black hole of conventional 
finance. 
8. Islamic finance has become ridden with products of ill repute.   
8.1. An initial estimation of Tawarruq in Saudi Arabian 
Islamic finance could be as high as 60 percent.  The top 
members of Shari’ah boards there appear unrepentant, even 
after the decisive Fatwas issued by two major Fiqh academies: 
the International and Rabita Academies. 
8.2. Tawarruq estimate in the UAE can be as high as 30 
percent as three of the four new Islamic banks that started 
operations during 2009 are Tawarruq oriented. 
8.3. Tawarruq is not the only product of ill repute.  Other 
products are based on ‘Eina as well as risk trading. 
9. This has violated the basic principle of avoiding Reba. 
10. The fact that the Tawarruq prophets in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf explicitly rejected the decisions of the two Fiqh Academies 
raises an important moral issue regarding the process of 
collective Ijtihad.   
11. By including unqualified members in Shari’ah boards, 
shareholders have been unethical and the unqualified violated 
their religious ethics. 
12. Self regulatory institutions have not been ethically perfect: 
12.1. AAOIFI has introduced a standard for Tawarruq. 
12.2. IFSB has dodged the issue of setting governance rules for 
Shari’ah boards in order to weed out the unqualified. 
13. Self-styled members of Shari’ah boards insist that they are not 
bound by resolutions of Fiqh academies.  This is an attempt to 
destroy the credibility of the process of group Ijtihad.   
14. Some qualified Shari’ah scholars have given more prominence 
to formal validity of contracts and much less importance to 
validity of purpose.  In particular, some of them closed their eyes 
to transactions that included multiple sale contracts (each would 
be valid by itself) but the transaction would boil down to selling 
present for future money.  The mechanistic approach still figures 
supreme in Fiqh with insufficient concern for Maqassid. 
B. MULTI-TIER PROCESS OF FATWA FORMULATION 
1. There is no agreed division of labor among Shari’ah and 
economic scholars regarding the formulation of Fatwas. 
1.1. Suppose that Shari’ah scholars would concentrate on 
formal validity of contract, while economists would direct their 
efforts on identifying the economic effects of transactions that 
may be considered as formally valid in order to evaluate the 
validity of purpose.  Issuing a Fatwa can become a three-tier 
process.   
1.1.1. The first tier is to evaluate formal validity through 
Shari’ah scholarship, 
1.1.2. The second tier is to evaluate the validity of purpose 
through looking into the micro and macroeconomic 
activities through economics scholarship. 
1.1.3. The third tier is to combine both in one fatwa 
through joint discussion between Shari’ah and economics 
scholars. 
1.2. Obviously, the second tier can be done first before 
Shari’ah scholars make their judgment on formal validity. 
C. ADDING SHARI’AH AUDITING TO BANKING SUPERVISION 
1. Banking regulators should add to their supervisory functions of 
Islamic banks Shari’ah auditing.  
2. This can be done by appointing experienced Shari’ah auditors. 
3. As an alternative, regulators can require external Shari’ah 
auditing.  
4. Shari’ah auditing at the regulators level should include checking 
the product structuring and documentation processes, 
qualifications of Shari’ah board members, strength and 
effectiveness of the internal Shari’ah auditing department, 
following of resolutions of International Shari’ah academy. 
D. INCLUDING SHARI’AH ASPECTS IN THE RATING SYSTEM OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
1. Rating agencies should include the Shari’ah aspects of Islamic 
financial products when rating Islamic financial institutions. 
2. The first aspect is the qualifications of Shari’ah board members.  
Consequently, if the Shari’ah board members are unqualified, in 
the sense explained above, their products must get the lowest 
level of rating automatically. 
3. The second is the composition of a Shari’ah department to 
support the efforts of Shari’ah boards.  The stronger is the 
staffing of the Shari’ah department the higher should be the 
rating. 
4. The third is the size and qualifications of the Shari’ah auditing 
unit or department working under the Shari’ah board.  Rating 
agency must discover for themselves a proper measure for the 
size of the auditing unit.  Examples can be the ratio of the 
Shari’ah auditing to total staff, the ratio of Shari’ah auditing 
payroll to total payroll, and the ratio of Shari’ah auditors per 
asset (similar to the employment/asset ratio).  The higher is the 
chosen ratio, the higher is the rating. 
5. The fourth aspect is the substance of the Shari’ah board reports 
and the record of their implementation.  Is Shari’ah reports 
routinely do not mention any significant violations and do not 
create significant discussions on the General Assembly and the 
Board of Directors, then we know that such reports are mere 
formality.  Lower rating should be given. 
E. MOVING FROM SELF TO BALANCED REGULATION 
1. Islamic finance was never proposed to be self regulated. 
2. Self regulation came about because of the vacuum left by the 
lack of engagement by central banks, which either insisted on 
applying the same regulations to both conventional and Islamic 
banks (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Central Bank of 
Egypt) or applying no regulations at all. 
3. Regulation of Islamic finance should not be left to the industry 
alone.  It should be a process in which the following parties 
would participate: 
3.1. National regulators: central banks or Financial Service 
Authorities, 
3.2. The Fiqh Academies, 
3.3. The IFSB, 
3.4. The General Council of Islamic Banks, 
3.5. The Islamic Research and Training Institute, IDB. 
3.6. The International Association for Islamic Economics, 
IAIE, 
4. Each regulating body would monitor Islamic finance performance 
under its jurisdiction. 
5. A committee representing all parties would meet periodically, 
examine detailed data and make recommendations to national 
regulators. 
6. The most problematic side is that of the choice of Shari’ah board 
members and the governance rules of Islamic boards. 
6.1. We suggest that members of Shari’ah boards must be 
certified by IFSB.   
6.2. IFSB would form an academic committee that includes 
three deans of Shari’ah colleges, chosen from the ten top 
Shari’ah colleges worldwide and three economists with PhD’s 
in economics from the top fifty economics schools worldwide.  
The committee would be chaired by the Secretary General of 
the International Fiqh Academy.  The committee would certify 
candidates nominated for membership in Shari’ah boards, 
either as Shari’ah or economics scholars.  Certification would 
be based upon:  
6.1. Academic credentials (quality and relevance of PhD 
degrees, teaching and research track record).  
6.2. Interview of candidates, 
7. Central banks would require that shareholders would appoint 
only IFSB-certified candidates. 
8. Such solution would resolve the problem of corporate governance 
of Shari’ah boards at the industry level.  However, knowing the 
politics involved in a regional organization like the IFSB, it may 
not possible to implement.   
9. An alternative is that each monetary authority would take direct 
responsibility for the corporate governance of the Islamic banks 
under its supervision.  This can be done through the following: 
9.1. Forming a Shari’ah Advisory Committee (SAC) as an arm 
of the regulators that include: 
9.1.1. The chairmen of Shari’ah departments in the three 
top-ranking universities in the countries, 
9.1.2. The chairmen of the economics department in the 
two top-ranking universities in the countries, 
9.1.3. All nominees to Shari’ah board membership must 
submit their qualifications to SAC for approval.  Only those 
approved by SAC can become members of Shari’ah boards.  
F. BUILDING UP AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING IN ISLAMIC FINANCE 
1. The purpose here is to provide knowledge and skills to those 
working in Islamic finance. 
2. It should be distinct from the efforts placed into the process of 
the islamization of knowledge. 
3. The experience of the Training Unit at the Emirates Islamic Bank 
can be useful in this regard. 
3.1. The design of a number of courses that cover all aspects 
of Islamic finance, 
3.2. Training material and instruction is done by people with 
PhD’s in Shari’ah and/or economics, depending on the 
subject matter. 
3.3. Courses from economics, accounting and management 
can be added to formulate diploma and MA programs. 
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